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SUBOPTIMIZATION BY RATIONING*
Minda R. Schechtert
I. INTRODUCTION
Government regulation of the sources of supply and production
has had a significant impact on this nation's economic life ever since
the inauguration of the New Deal in the 1930's. Rationing, price con-
trols, minimum wage laws, and import quotas are just a few of the
many devices now employed by the federal government in order to
achieve desired social or economic ends. Frequently, however, well-
intentioned regulations actually harm those groups that they were
designed to protect.'
This article will explore how government regulation of petroleum
marketing and, in particular, recently enacted legislation giving the
President power to ration gasoline can have such counter-productive
effects.
Since the 1973 oil embargo, geologic and economic factors which
indicate that crude oil is a depletable natural resource have not signifi-
cantly changed.2 In fact, the OPEC nations have continued to increase
their production and supply of oil to industrial nations,3 price controls
* The author wishes to acknowledge the guidance and valuable suggestions of Profes-
sor William F. Baxter of Stanford Law School and the insights offered by Michael
Duncheon.
t A.B. Smith College; J.D. Stanford Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles; former Associate, Sidley & Austin; Fellow in Law and Econom-
ics, Columbia University School of Law and Center for Law and Economic Studies.
1. A classic example is minimum wage laws which fix wages at artificially high levels.
Because demand for laborers decreases as the wage scale is forced higher, employers will
hire fewer people. The job market will shrink and the level of unemployment will rise.
Thus, many potential wage earners, whom such laws were designed to protect, may ironi-
cally be left in a worse position by not being able to be employed at all. See, e.g., P. SAMU-
ELSON, ECONOMICS 393-94 (9th ed. 1973).
2. The finite amount of oil, the decreasing supply, and the limits on the rate at which it
can be recovered are discussed in Flower, World OilProduction, SCIENTIFIC AM., Mar. 1978,
at 42 [hereinafter cited as Flower]. United States domestic oil production, for example, is
down about 700,000 barrels a day since 1972, while President Carter's announced oil import
target of 8.5 million barrels a day was considerably more than the United States imported in
1978. OPEC's Painful Squeeze, TIME, July 9, 1979, at 12, 14; C. TUGENDHAT & A. HAMIL-
TON, OIL THE BIGGEST BUSINESS (1975) (see especially The Energy Crisis, ch. 21, at 214).
3. See OPEC'r Painful Squeeze, TIME, July 9, 1979, at 12.
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on gasoline continue to exist,4 and Congress granted to the President
emergency gas rationing powers' in the event the so-called "shortage"
should become more extreme. Eleven states and the District of Colum-
bia imposed odd-even gas sales systems in July of 1979 evidencing a
felt need to allocate limited supply.6
In 1979, Congress, in response to the recent crisis in Iran, granted
to the President authority to impose gasoline rationing in the event of
an emergency supply situation.' The Act requires the President to sub-
mit a standby rationing plan to Congress for review within 120 days of
enactment that could only be rejected by a joint resolution of disap-
proval within thirty days of submission to the Congress. This require-
ment, that the President's plan be disapproved within thirty days or the
plan is approved, was a point of great controversy in the congressional
battle over this legislation, and was intended to eliminate potential
politicism from the decision to impose rationing.
Congress is granted by the Act, however, power to veto a presiden-
tial decision to impose an approved gas rationing plan. The President
cannot impose rationing unless there is a severe energy supply disrup-
tion. Such a disruption requires a 20% shortfall of home heating oil,
gasoline, and diesel for at least thirty days. Additionally, the disrup-
tion must be one that is not manageable by other emergency proce-
dures. With prior congressional approval, rationing can be imposed
with a less-than-20% shortfall.
Under the Act, gasoline is to be distributed on the basis of the
4. On October 24, 1979, Congress voted 225 to 189 against an amendment which would
have eliminated the federal price controls on gasoline. See House Votes to Keep Gasoline
Price Curbs, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1979, pt. I, at I, col. 5.
Acting under the authority of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 15
U.S.C.A. § 757 (West 1976 & Supp. 1980), the Carter administration ordered phased decon-
trol of domestic crude oil prices effective June 1, 1979. See Bachman, Carter Will Phase Out
Crude Price Lid, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 9, 1979, at 80 [hereinafter cited as Bachman]. During
the period of June 1979 to September 1981, the President has authority to control oil prices
in any manner he chooses. In September 1981, when the President's authority to control
prices will expire, domestic prices should have risen to the world level.
Thus, though phased decontrol has begun, gasoline remains price controlled while
other petroleum products may command their free market price. This fact alone can con-
tribute to a "shortage" of gasoline or its underproduction in the mix of petroleum products,
as will be demonstrated in Figure 7 and accompanying text.
5. Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 749 (1979)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6261 and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)). For a
brief discussion of the Act, see text accompanying notes 7-11 infra.
6. 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1336 (1979).
7. Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 749 (1979)
(codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)).
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number of driver's licenses, not on the number of vehicles.' Drivers
would be issued coupons which they could use either to purchase gaso-
line or to sell to other drivers on a "white market."9 Thus, for instance,
drivers of fuel efficient cars might be able to sell their excess coupons at
whatever price the market would bear to other drivers whose fuel needs
were greater.
The Act also requires the states to assume primary responsibility
for developing state plans to meet targets set by the federal govern-
ment. In the event of an energy emergency, a state would be required
to submit a plan to the Secretary of Energy within forty-five days of
publication of the targets. If no plan is submitted, or the state plan is
disapproved, the federal government would impose conservation meas-
ures. A state could request judicial review of the targets set by the Pres-
ident, of findings that the state failed to meet targets, or of a
disapproved state plan. Yet, there would be no reason ever to impose
rationing if the market forces were allowed to work freely.
In truth, shortage occurs only where price is controlled, thereby
preventing supply and demand from equilibrating at the market-clear-
ing price level. '0 Thus, to the extent that the federal government main-
tains direct or indirect controls over crude oil or gasoline" another
shortage will likely be perceived in the near future.' 2 Such controls
8. H.R. REP. No. 96-763, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1764, 1773-74.
9. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 25.
10. "This observation follows from the fact that at some price the energy market will
clear. As long as eitner less is demanded or more supplied as price increases [or both], there
is some price at which supply equals demand." E. MITCHELL, U.S. ENERGY POLICY 1
(1974) [hereinafter cited as MITCHELL]. M. FRIEDMAN & R. RoOSA, THE BALANCE OF PAY-
MENTS 1-5 (1967) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMAN & RoOSA]. A. ALCHIAN, No TIME TO
CONFUSE 1, 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ALCHIAN].
11. Following the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the federal government responded with the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) of 1973. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 751-756 (West 1976).
Among the provisions of the Act was a two-tiered price control system in which the price for
"old" oil, that is, the quantity of crude oil produced in the United States in the correspond-
ing months of 1972, was subject to an average maximum price, while "new," "released,"
"stripper," and imported oil were uncontrolled in price. These regulations were superseded
in February, 1976 by provisions of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 753 (amending § 4 of the EPAA), 757-760h (West 1976 & Supp. 1980). This Act pro-
vided for a three-tiered pricing structure for domestic crude oil. Under this system only
imported crude oil and, as of September, 1976, "stripper" oil were free from maximum price
controls.
Under both Acts, refined petroleum products were originally subject to price controls.
In 1976, all major petroleum products other than gasoline were exempt from such controls.
See Federal Energy Administration Regulation: Report of the Presidential Task Force (P.W.
MacAvoy, ed., 1977) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report]. See note 4 supra.
12. As determined by a 1975 study undertaken by the American Enterprise Institute
19801
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could lead to a shortage severe enough to trigger government-con-
trolled gas rationing pursuant to the Emergency Energy Conservation
Act.'3 The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the many allocative
inefficiencies, market distortions, and counterproductive consequences
that would be created by gasoline rationing. 4
II. DISCUSSION
A. Objectives of Rationing
Rationing is one scheme proposed to achieve the objective of lim-
iting gasoline consumption in the United States and "equitably" divid-
ing the limited supply by means other than the price system.'-
Whether existing supplies of gasoline should, must, or will be limited,
is itself a debatable issue. The considerations and espoused objectives
of such government intervention need to be explored.
Two principal arguments are advanced for the purported necessity
of curtailing our present consumption of gasoline: (1) independence
from foreign oil sources; and (2) conservation of a depletable natural
resource. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 impressed many decision-
makers with concern that dependence upon Middle East oil jeopard-
ized United States foreign policy.' 6 Such concerns, in conjunction with
the presumed balance of payments difficulties caused by the flow of
dollars to the Arab states, prompted then President Richard Nixon to
announce his Project Independence that was to give the United States
the potential to be energy self-sufficient by 1980. Obviously, the United
States has been unable to approach that goal. In fact, world oil prices
entitled Performance of the Federal Office, the "shortage" during the Arab embargo was
more the result of government policies than of anything else. In other countries, the price
was permitted to rise and lines in gasoline stations did not exist. So long as government
price controls exist, perceived "shortage" is likely. See 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 317
(1979).
For a prediction of shortage again occurring, see Reid, Supply Pinch-The Worst Yet?,
NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, Apr. 1979, at 53-59. See also Swearingen Sees Continued Tight
OilSupply, OIL & GAS. J., June 18, 1979, at 61.
13. Pub. L. No. 96-102, 93 Stat. 749 (1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6261 and scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 1980)). See text accompanying notes 7-9 supra.
14. The inefficiencies analyzed herein are allocative suboptimization and are in addition
to the actual costs of administering a rationing program. Such costs are wasteful transaction
costs. See Williamson, The Economics ofAntitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 1439 (1974). Such transaction costs, however, would not particularly cause dis-
tortions in consumption or production.
15. A de facto non-price form of allocating limited supply has been suggested in Barzel,
A Theory of Rationing by Waiting, 17 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1974).
16. 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1394 (1979).
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in the 1970's rose more than tenfold,' 7 and the United States has pledg-
ed to "limit" oil imports to 8.2 million barrels a day through 1985.18
The Iranian crisis at the end of 1979 and rising prices from OPEC na-
tions19 have only increased the desire in the United States for energy
self-sufficiency.
The desirability of curtailing demand for foreign petroleum, for
reasons of either foreign policy or balance of payments considerations,
is beyond the scope of this article. It is noteworthy, however, that Pro-
ject Independence was precipitously launched without public aware-
ness of the high cost of a protective energy policy,2° and without public
consideration of alternative means of coping with the threat of being
cut off from foreign oil supplies, e.g., stockpiling petroleum.2'
Under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975, a
three-tiered price control structure was enacted for domestic crude oil,
while imported crude oil and "stripper oil" are free from maximum
price constraints.22 In addition, the Federal Energy Administration's
Crude Oil Entitlement Program 23 enables domestic refiners to enjoy a
crude oil cost advantage which allows them to undercut foreign prod-
uct imports.24 The Carter administration ordered plans for phased de-
control of domestic crude oil to begin by June 1, 1979 with complete
decontrol achieved by September 30, 1981.25 There was much activity
in Congress, however, attempting to block Carter's decontrol plans.26
Those opposed to Carter's lifting price controls were sponsoring an
amendment to the energy department budget authorization bill which
would restrict the Department of Energy (DOE) from spending any
17. President's Economic Report to Congress of Jan. 30, 1980, reported in [March 1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 142, 151.
18. President's State of the-Union Address, Jan. 23, 1980, [March 1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 130, 135.
19. See, e.g., OPEC Indicates Some Oil Prices Will Keep Rising, Wall St. J., Dec. 21,
1979, at 2, col. 2.
20. See Nordhaus, The Allocation of Energy Resources, 1973 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 529, 567-68 (gains from international trade made from non-petroleum
products can be utilized to purchase oil more cheaply than would be produced by an energy
self-sufficiency program) [hereinafter cited as Nordhaus].
21. Oil stockpiling as a precaution against potential unavailability of imported oil is
discussed in MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 43.
22. Task Force Report, supra note 11.
23. 10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1980). For a lucid description of the entitlements program, see
Sherwood, Crude Oil Entitlements Program, MONTHLY ENERGY REV., Jan. 1977, at 2.
24. Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 73.
25. See Bachman, supra note 4, at 80.
26. See Oil Decontrol Wins in Close Committee Vote, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 822,
822-23 (1979); Bachman, Skirmishing Begins on Crude Decontrol, OIL & GAS J., May 7,
1979, at 49.
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money to implement oil decontrol.2 7 Despite the difficulties, however,
Carter's decontrol program did go into effect on June 1, 1979.
Increased prices due to Carter's decontrol program will lead to in-
creased profits for the oil companies. In a move to capture some of
these profits, President Carter signed on April 2, 1980 a $227.7 billion
windfall profits tax bill on United States oil companies.2 ' Although
called a tax on profits, it actually would not apply to profits, but rather
to price increases due to deregulation above the 1979 price levels.
The tax rate levied on the selling price of oil is 70% for most oil
discovered before 1979 and produced by major companies. The tax is
charged on the difference between a base price of $12.89 a barrel and
the prevailing selling price. Tax rates of 30% to 60% are imposed for
newly discovered oil, stripper oil, and the first 1000 barrels of oil
pumped daily from independent producers. The tax is scheduled to
phase out no sooner than 1988 or no later than 1991, depending on how
quickly the $227.7 billion in revenue is collected.
If the real social cost of domestic petroleum is considered, it may
be more advantageous to dispense with domestic price controls and al-
low international free trade to allocate the oil and other resources.2 9
This can be demonstrated by Figure 1.
In Figure 1, United States production possibilities of oil versus
other goods which trade in the world market are depicted by the curved
line, suggestive of diminishing returns and increasing costs. The prices
at which these goods trade in the world market will determine the opti-
mal production mix from the point of view of producers. A straight
line can be drawn representing a fixed level of expenditure, and which
slope is -Poii/Pmisc, or negative the ratio of the world prices.30
If the United States attempts to produce all its oil needs internally,
27. See Carter Bucks Antidecontrol Pressure, OIL & GAS. J., June 4, 1979, at 67.
28. April 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223. Decontrol will allow U.S. prices of oil to rise to
world market levels and cost consumers $1 trillion in the 1980's. L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1980,
pt. I, at 28, Col. I.
29. In some instances, such as depletion of a scarce natural resource, the present private
cost to the producer may be less than the social cost to society. See E. MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMIcs THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 427-29 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MANS-
FIELD].
30. The equation of the line is:
Total U.S. Expenditure at World Prices = Pi0 Qoil + PmiscQmisc or rearranging,
Total PoiI
IPmise Prais
See, e.g., S. KAISH, MICROECONOMICS 98, 99 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KAISH].
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then some point such as point A along the production possibility fron-
tier would represent the level of oil and miscellaneous goods available
to the United States consumers. Alternatively, the United States could
produce at point B where the production function is tangent to the
world price line, i e., where United States production's marginal rate of
technical substitution is equal to the price ratios dictated by world de-
mand.31 This, it will be shown, is a maximization point. Since the
price line represents a fixed level of expenditure, the United States
would be able to trade the miscellaneous goods it produces for more oil
it desires, until reaching some point C. Such production maximization
and trade render possible a higher total consumption level for Ameri-
cans, than does any point A on the production possibility curve to
which we would be constrained if oil independence were sought.
Figure 1 - Benefits of trade considering real costs and no price controls
MISC.
OTHER GO
Frontier
OIL
In any event, import quotas, price controls, and rationing would
be one means of achieving energy self-sufficiency. One problem with
3 1. For maximization analysis of production possibility frontier, see G. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 162-65 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER]; and MANSFIELD,
supra note 29, at 92-95.
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such a strategy, in addition to those discussed infra, is that if United
States producers are legally precluded from importing substantial
quantities of foreign oil, or economically precluded because the domes-
tic price for gasoline is kept below the world price, United States pro-
ducers will not bid for OPEC oil to be used in our domestic market.
Consequently, there will be less likelihood that a member of the OPEC
cartel can be offered a sufficiently large order at a sufficiently tempting
price that it would consider breaking from the cartel.
Public support for curtailing consumption of gasoline is also ex-
plained by a felt need to conserve a depletable resource. Support for
rationing as a petroleum conservation measure betrays a distrust of the
free market's ability to reflect petroleum scarcity value in an increas-
ingly higher price. It is conceivable to advocate that supply and de-
mand determinations be wrestled from the free market mechanism if
one believes that the supply or marginal cost curve to producers does
not reflect the true cost to society. One ordinarily expects the scarcity
value of a commodity to be reflected in its price. It is possible, how-
ever, that private institutions systematically overestimate the potential
of future alternatives in oil or other energy sources and hence have set
price too low and output too high. In any case, on the assumption of
producers' underestimation of societal costs, the government might at-
tempt to estimate the "true" cost curve, S,, and limit quantity according
to where that curve intersects demand.
32
While the efficiency of the market in valuing a depletable resource
is not free from debate,33 the market is likely to be more efficient than
interventions by the government which amount to arbitrarily ordained
cutbacks in permissible consumption levels achieved by artificial
means. It is certainly not the case, as some believe, that every curtail-
ment in consumption by whatever means is economically wise.
Finally, rationing is perceived by some as a means of protecting
the poor from the upward drift in gasoline prices. The focus is not on
decreasing gasoline consumption, but upon helping the poor bear the
effects of increasing prices of gasoline.
34
32. An analysis of societal costs versus private costs appears in MANSFIELD, supra note
29, at 427-29.
33. Compare Nordhaus, supra note 20, with Davidson, Falk & Hoesung Lee, Oil, Its
Time Allocation and Project Independence, 1974 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIV-
mTy 411, 413-19 (takes issue with Nordhaus theory that competitive market can most effi-
ciently allocate scarce resources).
34. The income distribution impact of rationing is analyzed in Figures 7, 8, and 9 and
accompanying text.
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Figure 2 - Supply curves reflecting real costs
S
society
" s- tax
QUANTITY of GASOLINE
S producers
Q
1 million gallons/day
B. Consumer and Producer Surplus
As soon as quantity is limited by non-market forces, there exists a
discrepancy between producers' supply curve and consumer demand,
as evidenced in Figure 2. It is at this point that debates arise as to the
best mechanism for distributing the burdens, the benefits, and the gaso-
line. Four possibilities are immediately evident.
The first alternative would be for the government to merely limit
producers' quantity of output, and leave the market otherwise un-
touched. Assuming such limitations were enforced, the effect, as seen
in Figure 2, would be a rise in gasoline prices to Ps, the height of the
demand curve at Qs, the prescribed quantity. Under such circum-
stances, all of rectangle BDEG, constituting "excess profits," would go
to the producers.
1980]
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Because there is public concern about high profits to the oil com-
panies, imposition of an excise tax is another alternative. A tax on pro-
ducers has the effect of raising the supply curve to the extent of the tax.
The government might want to impose a tax to the full magnitude of
the societal cost curve. In that event, supply and demand would natu-
rally arrive at Q, in Figure 2 and the entire rectangle BDEG would go
to the government. Alternatively, a tax of some lesser magnitude might
be imposed, generating an effective supply curve at Stax. Under such
circumstances, if the quantity were still constrained to Q, then the
price would be P. rather than P, with no quantity control. The com-
pany would then be permitted to keep profits BTUG, while TDEU
would go the government. It is important to note that this analysis as-
sumes naively that no adverse effects upon production incentives would
be generated by the tax.
A third alternative not often advocated would be for the govern-
ment to limit the quantity of production to Q, fix prices at the current
level PI, and distribute nontransferable coupons to the extent of Q,.
This system is not frequently advocated because consumers are always
better off if they are permitted to trade, 35 and because a black market
would inevitably develop for such purpose. If such a scheme were in-
stituted and perfectly enforced, profits CDEF would go to the produ-
cers, and BCFG would go to consumers in the form of reduced price.
The fourth and most popular alternative scheme entails price-
fixing at current level P1 concomitant with distribution of transferable
coupons to the extent of limited quantity Qs. Under such a program, as
above, the oil companies would maintain producer surplus CDEF. In
this case, the consumer surplus BCFG would go not to consumers, but
to coupon holders, whether or not they purchased gasoline. Under all
four programs, because of the limitation in quantity supplied, producer
surplus ACD and consumer surplus ACB are lost. It is interesting to
note that Q, might conceivably be chosen, as the diagram suggests, at
some level resembling monopoly maximization. In such circumstances,
the amount of deadweight loss of surplus could be virtually the same
under government-imposed rationing as with pure monopoly in the
gasoline industry.3
6
It is important to note that it is only where price is held fixed be-
low the market-clearing level, as in options three and four, that the
35. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
36. Monopoly maximization would be determined by the intersection of the marginal
rate and the supply curve. See J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 201-03 (1952). The level of output
chosen for monopoly maximization could well resemble Q. in Figure 2.
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notion of "shortage" arises. Where the price reflects the height of the
demand curve at the quantity being supplied, there is no "shortage. 37
Therefore, a crucial determinant of the effects of a rationing program is
the fixed price element.38
C. Market Signalling.
It is important not to confuse the effects of "shortage" with the
effects of rationing. When used with reference to the oil situation in the
Figure 3 - "Shortage" supply curve
PRICE
P
2
pi
S s(no imports)12
I
I (with trade)
37. See MITCHELL, supra note 10, at 1, 12, l7passim; FRIEDMAN & RoOSA, supra note
10, at 1-5; and ALCHIAN, supra note 10, at 7.
38. The fixed price element will be studied as part of the analysis of rationing programs,
infra. One should keep in mind in reading the following material whether such price main-
tenance should be an objective in itself, as rationing advocates imply. If we are sincerely
concerned about income distribution effects, is a gasoline rationing program the proper
means to deal with it?
1980]
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United States, "shortage" implies a decrease in supply, or a steepening
of the supply curve beyond a certain range. Thus, if S, in Figure 3
above represents the supply curve when trade is allowed, $2 might re-
flect a good approximation of the new, steeper supply curve when, for
example, imports are limited and domestic producers must begin to
utilize additional but more expensive domestic sources.39 Such a
change in the supply curve without an immediate corresponding
change in price would create a "shortage" situation.
The pre-shortage price is represented by PI, and the "shortage"
market-clearing price would be P2. Rationing is an attempt by the gov-
ernment to distribute Q2 gallons of gasoline at price P,. If the coupons
were nontransferable, and there were no black markets and abuses,
that would indeed be the program achieved. Once coupons are trans-
ferable in either a white or a black market, however, the effective cost
of gasoline to the consumer is the pump price plus the cost of the cou-
pon. Basic demand theory would suggest that the value of the coupons
would equilibrate to just equal the difference between Pt and the height
of the demand curve at. Q2, the quantity available.
The total cost to the consumer will be the height of the demand
curve at the quantity supplied, whether coupons are used or the pump
price is permitted to freely rise. If one thinks of demand as willingness
to pay, then it becomes clear that neither a decrease in supply nor an
artificial program to distribute gasoline should alter willingness to
pay,40 assuming no substantial psychological effects of the "shortage."
The only way in which willingness to pay, or demand, might be af-
fected is to the extent that distribution of coupons constitutes increase
in income which might increase, not decrease, willingness to pay of
some individuals. One cannot predict afortiori whether such an effect,
if existent, would be a shift in the demand curve or a change in slope.4'
There are two reasons to believe that any change in the demand curve
as a result of coupon rationing would, in fact, be negligible. First,
while the coupons would have a transfer value, the magnitude of in-
crease in any individual's income as a result of the coupons is likely to
39. The shape of these supply curves is merely suggestive of the technology. See
Flower, supra note 2. The analysis would apply equally well with a straight shift in the
supply curve, for example.
40. This conclusion is in marked contrast to World War II rationales which assumed
that rationing limits demand. See, e.g., S. HARRIS, PRICE AND RELATED CONTROLS IN THE
UNITED STATES 269 (1945).
41. The result would likely depend upon the predominance of the income effect versus
the substitution effect resulting from coupon distribution. Analysis of these effects as gener-
ated by rationing will be undertaken in the text accompanying notes 54-56 infra.
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be quite small relative to his total income. Second, it is unlikely that
any individual would spend all, or indeed a substantial portion of his
increased income on a single good. The fact that it was received with
the label "for gasoline" does not change the essential quality of the
saleable coupons as being increased income, available for any purpose.
This is true so long as the coupons have a resale value in either a white
or black market where equal access to trade is facilitated.
Despite the above assertions that demand is not changed by the
use of ration coupons, it is important to note that the market signalling
function regarding demand is distorted by the coupon system. The
problem arises because consumers and producers do not see gasoline
being sold at the same price. The price producers or sellers receive is
the pump price; the price consumers must pay is the pump price plus
the coupon price.
If the free market were allowed to operate, the cost of gasoline to
consumers would be lower and the quantity supplied would be greater
than under a rationing scheme. This can be demonstrated by Figure 4.
Therein, SI represents the supply curve with trade and S2 depicts a do-
mestic supply curve when no foreign oil is imported. The rationing
scheme would fix pump prices at Pr, the price at which the free trade
supply curve intersects demand. With the new cost curve S2, the quan-
tity produced will be constrained to Qr, where S2 intersects P, How-
ever, consumers will be paying Pc while producers receive only Pr
.42 If
instead the free market were permitted to operate, then a new equilib-
rium of demand and S2 would emerge such that consumers would pay
and producers would receive Pf which is lower than Pc. At the same
time, suppliers would be able to cover greater costs, and thus supply
quantity Qf which is greater than Qr. (Ql is the original quantity).
This analysis reveals one of the fallacies underlying the rationing
program and the discrepancy in estimates of market prices for gasoline
in the absence of such a program. Rationing only operates on the de-
mand side and ignores the price-elasticity of supply. Because supply
increases as we allow price to rise freely, the ultimate cost to consumers
will be lower when no rationing is undertaken, than when the govern-
ment steps in attempting to mitigate a price increase. In fact, assuming
a heightened supply curve S2, if the elasticity of supply were exactly
equal to the elasticity of demand, then the cost increase to consumers
due to "shortage" would be half as much with no rationing as with such
government interference. These bizarre effects are predictable because
42. The misallocative effects of this discrepancy will be discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 47-50 infra. -
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than free market, when no imports
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S (withtrade)
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QUANTITY Q QI Q1
the rationing program distorts the natural market-signalling of the
price system.
Not only is the incentive to increase production dampened by the
price freeze of the rationing program, but incentive to actually decrease
gasoline production may arise from the fact that gasoline is one of sev-
eral possible joint end-products of crude oil refinement.43 If the other
end-products such as fuel oil, distillates, or petrochemicals, for exam-
ple, were unregulated, then the price of these, unlike gasoline, would be
permitted to rise with the "shortage" of crude oil supply. Incentive is
thus created to alter the production mix to yield more of the unregu-
lated goods and decrease the relative yield of gasoline which is less
remunerative.44 With the altered production technique, a new supply
curve for gasoline might be drawn, as in Figure 5. It is evident that Qa,
43. Hearings on the Gasoline and Fuel Oil Shortage Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Economics of the Joint Economic Comm., S. REP. No. 93-63, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24,
reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1299, 1318 (statement of Senator John
Tower).
44. See Figures 6 & 7 and accompanying text regarding effects on production.
Vol. 13
SUB OPTIMIZA TION BY RA TIONING
the quantity supplied, is much less than Qf, the free-market level, and
Pa, the cost to consumers, is much higher. Thus, rationing with price
maintenance generates two distorting effects upon suppliers and yields
lower quantity and higher total cost to consumers than the free market
would bring.
Figure 5 - Alteredproduction mix with regulation
PRICE S3 (altered production mix)
S (no imports)
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D. Effects Upon 'Production
That multiproduct producers will actually alter their output mix in
response to a change in the price ratios of their products, can be
demonstrated with a basic economic model. For simplicity, let us as-
sume that only two products, gasoline and fuel oil, for example, can be
produced from crude oil. A "production possibility frontier" can be
mapped to represent the trade-off in producing more gasoline versus
more fuel oil. Then the slope of the curve at any point represents the
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marginal rate of technical transformation.45 The firm will maximize by
operating at that point on the curve where revenues are maximum. As
will be demonstrated, it turns out that such a point will be tangent to
the highest possible iso-revenue line, which represents all combinations
of the two products that will yield a given revenue, as suggested by
Figure 6.
Figure 6 - Producer maximization
\\ Hiahest Iso-revenue line
Possibility
GASOLINE
The equation of the iso-revenue line is:
Revenue = PgasQgas + Pf clQf 0cl
or rearranging:
Qf R Pg
Pf Pf
The significant observation is that the line which is tangent to the pro-
duction possibility frontier has a slope equal to the negative of the price
ratios, or -Pg/Pf. This means that the production mix will be deter-
mined by the ratio of prices of the two goods.46
If both the price of fuel oil and the price of gasoline change, it is
possible that the ratio of the prices would remain the same. If however,
45. See STIGLER, supra note 31, at 162-65, and KAISH, supra note 30, at 413-14.
46. See KAISH, supra note 30, at 413-18.
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only one price changes, or the two change unevenly, then the ratio of
prices will necessarily change as well. As a responsive consequence,
production output mix will shift until the marginal rate of technical
transformation is equal to the price ratio, or in short, until production
reaches the point tangent to the new maximum iso-revenue line.
Where changes in the prices of the goods reflect free market sig-
nals of the relative desirability to consumers of the two goods, then a
change in production mix is desirable and improves the allocation of
resources. However, where one price is artifically inhibited, as would
be the price of gasoline under a rationing program, the production mix
chosen in response to the "false" price ratio would obviously be misal-
locative. Producers would not generate the output mix which consum-
ers, through the price system, indicate they most desire. With coupon
rationing, this result accrues (1) because the price which consumers are
willing to pay (fixed pump price plus cost of coupon) is not the price
which producers receive (pump price); and (2) because gasoline is ra-
tioned while other end-products of crude oil are not.
Figure 7 - Altered production mix
FUEL
P 1
P2
f
Q- 1
f - ---
Q g2 4 Q 1 GASOUNE
Figure 7 illustrates the effect on the iso-revenue slope and production
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mix when fuel oil prices, for example, are permitted to rise in the
shortage while gasoline prices are not.
E. Resource Allocation
It is apparent that if the price of gasoline received by producers,
Pgi, is held constant while the price of fuel oil, Pfl, is permitted to rise
with the "shortage" to Pn, then the set of iso-revenue lines facing a
producer will exhibit a new, more gentle slope, -P. 1/Pa. As can be
seen in Figure 7, producers will perceive a new maximization point,
tangent to the new iso-revenue line. Effectively, producers will de-
crease gasoline output from Qgl to Qg2 and increase the yield of fuel oil
from Qfl to Q2.
Consumers, on the other hand, will not see the same price ratio as
producers. Although the government may hold the pump price of gas-
oline at PgI, the cost to consumers will be PgI plus the cost of the ration
coupons, which in turn will be determined by consumer demand for
gasoline, as we have seen.4 7
A series of indifference curves can be mapped for consumers, rep-
resenting various combinations of gasoline and fuel oil which will
render the individual equally satisfied, or in welfare economics termi-
nology, equally well off. The consumer will maximize his utility by
reaching the highest possible indifference curve he can, given the con-
straint of his budget. The slope of the indifference curve at any point
will represent the marginal rate at which the consumer is willing to
substitute fuel oil for gasoline. He will be maximizing when this margi-
nal rate of substitution (MRS) is equal to -Pgc/Pr2, the negative of the
ratio of prices for the two goods and the slope of the budget line.48 This
result accrues because the budget line for consumption of gasoline and
fuel oil is:
49
Budget = Pgas including couponQgas + PfuelQfuel
or rearranging:
B PgC
Qf = F - Qg
Pf Pf g
47. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
48. For a mathematical analysis of consumer maximization, see E. SILBERBERO, THE
STRUCTURE OF ECONoMics 223-33 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SILBERBERO].
49. See MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 33-35.
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Figure 8 - Consumer maximization
_P
MRS = C
P
f
Highest Utility Curve
GASOLINE
Recall that producers are maximizing at the marginal rate of tech-
nical transformation (MRT) = Pgl/Pf2 while consumers are maximiz-
ing at MRS = Pgc/Pf. If Pg1 were equal to Pgc, then MRT would be
the same as consumers' MRS and resources would be perfectly allo-
cated, assuming, of course, that Pfproducers = Pfmconsumers and no other
offsetting factors exist.5" Such a result would be generated if the free
market price system were left unencumbered. With coupon rationing
of gasoline and not other oil products, however, a misallocation of re-
sources will emerge, MRT # MRS, as illustrated in Figure 9.
50. See D. WINCH, ANALYTICAL WELFARE ECONOMICS 80 (1971) and MANSFIELD,
supra note 29, at 414-17.
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Figure 9 - Producer maximization with free market
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Producer maximization under rationing
FUEL
M --Pgl
MRT =-
GASOLINE
lF. Consumer UtiliY
The effect of gasoline rationing upon consumer utility and conse-
quent behavior can be depicted graphically in terms of price-consump-
tion and utility functions. Visual comparison between rationing and
free-market distribution of gasoline is thereby facilitated. For ease of
analysis, assume that a consumer spends all of his income and has a
choice between two goods, gasoline and miscellaneous. The consumer
can select any product mix to the extent that:
Income = PgasQgas + (ave)P..jsQnji,
This yields a budget fine:" l
5 1. See STIGLER, supra note 3 1, at 53-54, and MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 33-34.
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Figure 10 - Budget line
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Further assume that consumers can map a series of indifference
curves between the two goods, along which the consumer feels he is
equally well off. The individual will want to be on the highest possible
indifference curve subject to the constraint of his budget. Graphically,
this means that he will choose a product mix depicted as the point
where the indifference curve is tangent to the price-consumption line,
as we have seen in Figure 9 and above discussion.52 The slopes at the
point of tangency will obviously be equal. When there is a change in
the price ratios which a consumer faces, there will be a new maximiza-
tion point at which the tangency condition is fulfilled. A rise in the
price of gasoline will affect the budget line and level of consumer utility
as suggested by Figure 11. 53
52. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
53. For mathematics of the price effect, see SILBERBERG, supra note 48, at 235-37. See
also STIGLER, supra note 31, at 53-54, 62-63, and MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at 56-58.
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Figure 11 - Price increase in gasoline
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As previously shown, the effective price to consumers of gasoline will
increase, when quantity is cut back, irrespective of a government pro-
gram to fix pump prices at current levels. In fact, for a given quantity
of output, the cost to consumers should be the same under either free
market or saleable coupon rationing program, because the demand
function is the same.
The distinguishing feature in using transferable coupons, rather
than the market system, is the added dimension of income augmenta-
tion. If we attribute the value of the coupon as an added cost of gaso-
line consumption, then we must also recognize receipt of one's ration of
coupons as income to the extent of the value of the coupons which are
saleable. Thus, where a "short" supply of gasoline is to be rationed
with transferable coupons, there will be both a price effect and an in-
come effect as shown in Figure 12: 4
54. Further discussion of the income and price effects can be found in SILBERBERG,
supra note 48, at 350-62; STIGLER, supra note 31, at 63-64; and MANSFIELD, supra note 29, at
63-64.
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Figure 12
a) Theprice effect b) Incomepusprice efects
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It is for this reason that Tobin"
5 and others depict a rationed economy
as simply a change in slope, as from line A to line C in Figure 12
above. In order to distinguish consequences of the rationing program
from effects generated by the decreased supply and increased price to
consumers which result irrespective of a rationing program, it is neces-
sary to segregate the phenomena.
In Tobin's analysis, there appear to be persons made better off and
some made worse off by the rationing scheme. Specifically, those per-
sons whose indifference curves fall in the left-most region of the graph
are made better off, ie., are able to reach a higher indifference curve
than pre-rationing, while those in the right-hand portion of the dia-
gram are constrained to a lower indifference curve than their pre-ra-
tioning level. Segregating the income 
and price effects, however,
illuminates an interesting interpretation 
of Tobin's observation.
The price effect alone implies a pivoting 
inward of the price-con-
sumption line, such that the gasoline intercept is diminished and the
slope is increased. Everyone, to a greater or lesser degree depending on
his horizontal position, will be worse 
off in being constrained to a lower
indifference curve. When the income effect is added, the new slope
prevails, while the former income level is reinstated. It now becomes
apparent that if anyone is made better 
off, it is because of the grant of
income which happens to come in the 
form of gasoline coupons.
If a scheme of non-transferable coupons 
could be instituted, essen-
. In rer of the gheory of Rationing, 
20 ECONOMETICA 521, 534 (1952).
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tially a two-currency system would be created. 56 Individuals would ex-
perience a budget constraint from their money income, and an
analogous constraint imposed by their fixed coupon allotment.
a
MISC.
OTHER
GOODS
Figure 13 - Constrained by coupons or income
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Persons whose indifference curves lie in the left-most region of Figure
13 would be constrained by their budgets to leave coupons unused. In
contrast, persons, whose preferences between gasoline and miscellane-
ous place them toward the right of the graph, have money they would
like to spend on gasoline but lack the coupons to do so. It is clear that
both would be better off if trade were permitted. This illustration with
non-transferable coupons makes it clear that giving coupons a transfer
value generates windfall income to those who choose to sell their allot-
ment or part thereof.
56. Id.
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G Income Distribution
The significance of the coordinates of the graphs in Figures 12 and
13 is that those who gain from the rationing program, those whose in-
difference curves fall toward the left, are persons who consume rela-
tively little gasoline. Therefore, the gasoline rationing program
ironically appears to benefit most those who consume the least amount
of gasoline. According to Tobin's diagram, the gain to these persons is
ostensibly realized in the sale of the windfall coupons.
Many advocates of the rationing program assert that the poor will
be selling their coupons to the rich, and thus a beneficial income redis-
tribution will occur in those situations where the recipient does not
himself purchase gasoline. However, the economic model presents lit-
tle reason to believe that the horizontal position of a consumer's indif-
ference function bears any significant correlation to his income level.
The aggregate graph, as in Figure 12, is misleading since it assumes a
Figure 14 - Distribution of income levels and utilit functions
Q
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single or average income. More explicitly, a series of parallel budget
lines could be drawn reflecting differing income levels which face the
same price ratios.
The income and price effects of gasoline coupon distribution then
can be depicted as parallel rotation of each of those budget lines yield-
ing a new common slope -Pg2/Pm for the new set of parallel lines. At
all levels of income, the model demonstrates increased utility at the
left-most portion where relatively little gasoline is consumed, and de-
creased utility toward the right, for those who desire higher quantities
of gasoline. The point suggested by the model is that distribution of
gain and loss of utility bears no necessary relation to income level.
Thus, poor people might be found to the right, buying coupons, while
high income persons toward the left, earning windfall gain in the sale
of their coupons. If this scenario were accurate or prevalent, then gaso-
line coupon distribution would clearly not be achieving a desirable in-
come redistribution.
In fact, empirical evidence suggests that on the average, lower in-
come persons will consume relatively little gasoline and therefore will
be selling their coupons, while the reverse is likely to be true for per-
sons at high income levels. This would correlate with finding indiffer-
ence curves at low income levels primarily toward the left, and high
income indifference curves mainly in the right-hand region of the
graph. To the extent that such a pattern does emerge, coupon rationing
would indeed be redistributing income from wealthy drivers to low in-
come drivers. One may note that there are a number of qualifications
inherent in the preceeding sentence. First, there will be many cases in
which the "pattern" is not followed. Rigidity of jobs and residence lo-
cations in the short run, particularly with extensive unemployment, as
well as lack of capital to purchase more efficient automobiles, will dic-
tate inelastic demand for a number of low income persons, for whom
alternative transportation is not available. Moreover, one can expect a
number of wealthy individuals whose driving habits require little gaso-
line. To the extent that these two categories of consumers emerge, the
rationing program will be redistributing income from the poor to the
rich. Second, even if a desirable direction of flow is established, the
income redistribution is confined to "drivers." The question then be-
comes whether "drivers" is the appropriate class of individuals to re-
ceive income subsidy, and whether a government scheme which would
expend one billion dollars in administering itself is the best means of
achieving such aims.
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If we insist upon using a gasoline rationing mechanism for meet-
ing the income distribution concerns, then we might want to give cou-
pons only to persons below a certain income level. Even then, the
program concentrates upon drivers, as a privileged subset of the poor.
It is not clear why consumers of gasoline should receive better treat-
ment than consumers of any other commodity whose price increases. A
decision must be made whether subsidy is a desired goal and to whom
it should flow. If poor people are the target, then a direct income sub-
sidy would be more efficient than any plan related to gasoline. If in-
deed the goal is subsidization based upon gasoline consumption, then
there are more efficient possibilities than rationing.
One alternative plan which has been suggested would entail letting
the free market set price (and quantity) for gasoline and then give a
pro-rata tax rebate based upon the prior year's consumption levels that
might be determined through tax returns, for example.57 Under this
scheme, there is no distortion of the pricing system, thus no misalloca-
tion of resources.
III. CONCLUSION
It becomes clear that the goals, means, and consequences of a gas-
oline rationing program are all subject to serious question. Rationing
generates severe distortions in market signalling, utility maximization,
and resource allocation. If subsidy designed to mitigate the burdens of
high gasoline prices is a desired goal, then other nondistorting mecha-
nisms might be utilized, at lower administrative cost. The ultimate
question as to whether gasoline-based subsidy is itself a worthwhile en-
deavor deserves a rather dubious response.
57. Informal communication with Professor William F. Baxter, Stanford Law School.
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